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 “It is often assumed that an economy of private
enterprise has an automatic bias towards
innovation, but this is not so. It has a bias only
towards profit. It will revolutionise manu-
factures only if greater profits are to be made in
this way than otherwise.” (Hobsbawm, 1968
p.40). 
The drive to create new profitable sources of
income that are not beneficial to society can
be denoted destructive creativity. In this
paper we are concerned with privately profit-
able innovations that imply lower social
efficiency. One example of such creativity is
firms’ profit motivated sabotage of their
competitors, as studied by Veblen (1923).
According to Posner (1975) an important,
but often ignored, social cost of monopolies
is the resources wasted in the competition to
obtain the privileged monopoly position.
Bhagwati (1982) provides a taxonomy of
”Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking
Activities” which, in particular includes the
approach of Tullock (1967) who points to
the similarity between theft and monopoly
rents. All these examples are in contrast to
the Schumpeterian process of creative
destruction where the monopoly positions
that entrepreneurs achieve are temporary and
grounded in superior technologies. 
Destructive innovations take many forms.
For instance, the recent transition in Russia
has not only generated new markets, but also
new opportunities for creative criminals in
the form of extortion, contract enforcement
and ”protection”. The result is that the
growth of the productive sector is hampered
both by the ”business taxes” imposed by
mafia-like organizations and by the rise in
protection expenses. In 1994 criminal gangs
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Destructive creativity implies that parasites become more efficient in rent extraction. We
focus on destructive creativity in situations where parasites live on rents extracted from the
producers. A higher parasitic strength implies that the waste associated with rent seeking
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(Campos 2000). Similar parasitic activities
can be found in countries like Colombia,
Indonesia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, not to
mention the extremely violent experiences in
Sierra Leone and Liberia.
Entrepreneurs who specialize in violence
are inventive. In Colombia and Nigeria, for
instance, employees in the oil industry are
regularly kidnapped by violent entrepreneurs
and released for a ransom. Rebels also extort
the oil companies by threatening to blow up
their pipelines. According to the Economist
(2003)  ”Ransom insurance, now available,
has the effect of raising ransom demands,
and so increases the profits to be made from
violence”. 
In this paper we focus on destructive
creativity in situations where parasites live on
rents extracted from the producers. Creative
innovation then implies that the parasites’
strength in rent extraction increases. Does
this increase in parasitic strength imply that
the waste associated with rent seeking
declines? Or, does higher parasitic strength in
the long run erode business productivity,
implying that the sustainability of predation
is threatened by its improved efficiency? 
To explore these questions, we start out
from the premises that producers and
parasites are recruited from the same pool of
entrepreneurs. In this respect our approach is
similar to the seminal papers on the
misallocation of talent to unproductive
activities by Usher (1987), Baumol (1990),
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991 and
1993), and Acemoglu (1995).1
Improving the means of production
and the means of destruction
We are interested in rent-seeking activities
that are directed towards private businesses
in the absence of efficient protection of
private property rights. This type of parasitic
rent appropriation is different from regular
rent-seeking, where the target is an active
state. While regular rent seeking distort
political decisions by wasteful influence
activities, parasitic rent appropriation
challenges the state’s monopoly of taxation,
protection and legitimate violence. Rent
appropriation includes socially harmful and
destructive behaviors such as extortion,
robbery, and warfare. 
A positive development requires that these
destructive activities do not escalate.
Entrepreneurs must find it profitable to
create rather than to destroy. The Schumpe-
terian process of Creative Destruction is
clearly more creative than destructive in the
sense that modern modes of production
replace the traditional and total productivity
goes up. As Schumpeter emphasized the
process  “incessantly revolutionizes the
economic structure from within, incessantly
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a
new one.” (1942, p 83). While the process of
creative destruction is productive, the process
of destructive creativity is destructive as it
erodes the profitability of productive
behavior. 
Both processes consist of a repeated four-
stage interaction: Stimuli, adaptation,
consequences, and finally reinforcement of
the stimuli. In the case of creative destruction
the circle is as follows: The stimuli can be the
opening up of new opportunities such as new
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The adaptation comes from the pressure of
dynamic competition. Those enterprises that
do not innovate lose their market, and their
profits decline before they finally become
obsolete. Consequently, innovating firms
have an edge over their competitors. The
more the competitors innovate; the stronger
the pressure to search for new opportunities,
and the stimuli are reinforced implying a
productivity enhancing development. 
In the case of destructive creativity the
circle may be as follows: The stimuli can be a
breakdown of law and order, generating new
opportunities of extracting rents without
producing. Adaptation takes the form of
misallocation of entrepreneurial efforts into
unproductive rent extraction and into
protective measures against theft and
extortion. Rent extraction is a strategic
substitute for productive activities. The more
rents that can be extracted the lower the
profitability of producing, and the more
tempting it is to search for new opportunities
of rent extraction. Again the stimuli are
reinforced implying a stagnant or contracting
development. 
Thus, improved opportunities of rent
extraction leads in the short run to higher
profits to parasites, on the expense of the
producers, and hampers productive invest-
ments. In the longer run the profit
differential induces a reallocation of entre-
preneurs away from production. As produc-
tion declines and congestion among parasites
sets in, both parasites and producers lose
profits. Hence, in the long run improving the
means of rent extraction may be a loss even
for the parasites. 
In some countries destructive and productive
forces are present simultaneously implying
an implicit race between them.  When
productivity growth dominates the circle of
destructive creativity may be reversed as
profits in productive activities exceed profits
in rent extraction. In this case entrepreneurs
move from parasitic activities to production,
implying higher profits for both producers
and parasites. Our main point is this
asymmetry between creativity on the side of
producers versus creativity on the side of
parasites. More efficient parasites hurts all –
even the parasites. More efficient producers
benefits all – also the parasites. 
In order to make these assertions more
precise we illustrate the important mecha-
nism – the process of destructive creativity –
within a model that is kept as simple as
possible. The model is a simplification of
Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2003) and is
essentially the basic model of Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny (1993). 
An illustration
In this example there is a number of
entrepreneurs  n. A fraction α of these
entrepreneurs are producers, while the
remaining fraction (1 – α) are parasites. Each
producer produce a quantity of goods y with
a profit margin γ. Profits for the producers,
before predation is taken into account, are
therefore 
π = γy (1)
The parasites feeds on the producers. In the
case when a producer is approached by a
parasitic enterprise, it has to pay a share φy as
extortion money. The extortion share φ  is
determined by the strength of producers
relative to parasites. When self defense is
expensive, the value of φ is high. If the target
is insured against extortion, like oil
companies in Nigeria and Colombia, the
effective extortion share φ  will be even
higher. 
The probability of being approached by a
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net of protection money is thus given by 
πA = π – µφy = (γ – µφ)y (2)
The probability µ is equal to the number of
extortion cases x divided by the number of
productive firms αn. As in other matching
processes  x  depends on the fraction of
productive firms α relative to the fraction of
parasites (1 – α). At each point in time each
parasitic enterprise approaches only one
productive firm. Assuming full information
and no friction, x is then the lowest of αn
and (1 –  α)n. The probability of being
approached µ = x/(αn) simply becomes
µ = min [m,1],m = (1 – α)/α (3)
where  m  is the predation intensity in the
economy. 
The parasite that is first to approach a
productive firm is able to collect the pro-
tection money. The probability of being the
first is equal to the number of extortion cases
x divided by the number of parasites 
(1 – α)n. This probability can be expressed as
µ/m. The expected profits to a parasite can
now be defined as 
µ πB = – φy                                     (4) m
When  m  is less than one there is no
congestion among the parasites, µ/m =1 and
each parasite can extort its productive firm
without competition. When m is larger than
one, congestion sets in, and πB goes to zero as
m  goes to infinity. When there are more
parasitic enterprises than productive firms,
some productive firms are approached by
more than one parasite. In that case the
protection becomes effective and more
protection money need not be paid. We
assume in (4) that when some parasites end
up in conflict with others they do not waste
resources in this conflict. Combining (2) and
(4) it follows that 
πα = πAα + πB (1 – α) (5)
Hence, the gross profits are distributed to
productive and parasitic entrepreneurs
without any loss. 
What are the possible equilibrium
allocations of a given number of entre-
preneurs and what are the conditions for the
existence of a development trap caused by
the parasites? To answer these questions
observe that a feasible equilibrium implies an
allocation of entrepreneurs such that either
profits are the same in both activities or that
the activity with all the entrepreneurs has the
highest profits 
πA = πB  and α ∈ [1,0]              (6)
πA > πB  and α =1   (7)
πA < πB  and α =0 (8)
To describe these equilibria we draw the
profit curves (2) and (4) in Figure 1.
The fraction of producers α is measured
from left to right while the fraction of
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left. Let us start from the left where there is
congestion among the parasites. With only
one productive firm and n  –  1 parasitic
enterprises, the predation intensity m is high
and the producer is approached with
certainty  (µ = 1). As long a φ < γ profits to
the productive firm is positive. Due to the
high predation intensity profits to the
parasitic enterprises are approximately zero. 
As the fraction of productive firms increases
and the fraction of parasitic enterprises
declines, profits increase for the parasites
while profits in production is stable. This
holds as long as there is congestion. When α
gets above 1/2 there is no longer congestion
among parasites. From this point and
onwards the profit curve of the parasites
levels out. For the producers, however, the
profit curve increases as µ, the probability of
being approached, starts to decline in
tandem with the predation intensity m.
In Figure 1 the profit curves πA and πB
intersect twice. The condition for the curves
to cross twice is that πA < πB  in the point
where α = 1/2, and µ = m = 1. At this point
the producers are sure to be extorted and the
parasites are sure to be paid extortion money.
From (2) and (4) it is evident that the
condition is 
φ > γ /2      (9)
When the curves cross twice condition (6) is
satisfied in the two points e2 and e3 while
condition (7) is satisfied at e1.  By assuming
that entrepreneurs flow to the most
profitable activity e1 and e2 are locally stable
equilibrium points while e3 is an unstable
tipping point. The level of production is
lower at e2 than at e1 and we denote the
equilibrium point e2 a parasitic development
trap. If the economy starts out to the right of
e3, it ends up at the equilibrium point e1. If
the economy starts out to the left of e3 it ends
up in the trap at e2. 
In the trap e2 the condition (6) holds and
there is congestion among the parasites, m >
1 and producers are approached with
certainty (µ = 1). Inserting µ = 1 in (2) gives
us the following expression for the common
profit at the equilibrium point e2
πA = πB  = (γ  – φ)y (10)
From (10) it follows that at e2 profits in both
activities decline when the extortion share φ
increases or when the profit margin γ
decreases. Hence, we have 
Proposition 1. In the parasitic trap improved
efficiency in extortion, φ up, reduces profit-
ability both in production and extortion.
Improved efficiency in production, γ  up,
increases profitability in both activities. 
It may be counter-intuitive that a higher
extortion share implies lower profits to
parasitic enterprises. The reason is that a
higher extortion share φ  lowers profits for
producers relative to parasites, inducing
entrepreneurs to move from production to
parasitic activities. Hence, production
increases and profits to each producer go up.
The number of parasites grows at the expense
of producers until profits from parasitic
activities become as low as in production.
Thus, whatever benefits the thief harms both
the producer and the thief, which is a
corollary of the result in Usher (1987). 
The second part of the proposition is less
surprising. It simply states that improved
margins in production leaves a larger profit
to the producers. Such an efficiency improve-
ment induces a shift of entrepreneurs from
predation to production. 
The first part of the proposition is
illustrated in Figure 2. 
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πA and πB of a marginal increase in φ. In the
parasitic trap the effect is a drop in the
equilibrium profit. In the full production
equilibrium a marginal increase in φ has no
effect as there is no parasitic activity in that
equilibrium. However, if the increase in φ is
large    , so that φ get close to γ, as in Figure 3
there will be an  impact also for the good
equilibrium e1.
When  φ gets close the γ the profits from
being a parasite are almost as high as the
profits from being a producer. In that case
the stability of e1 becomes fragile as the
tipping point moves close to the equilibrium
point.
The equilibrium is still locally stable, but
a slight increase in the number of parasites
may move the economy beyond the tipping
point. Then a dramatic process will start
where the economy tumbles all the way
down to the parasitic trap. In accordance
with the Proposition, the parasitic trap will
be a particularly bad equilibrium when φ is
high. The reason is that it is relatively more
attractive to be a parasite when φ is large.
Therefore, in this case m must be high in
order to bring equilibrium between the
profits of production and the profits from
being a parasite. Hence, when φ ≈ γ, profits
are low and α is low in the parasitic trap. 
Concluding remarks on natural
resource rents
The main point that we want to stress is the
following asymmetry: While more efficient
producers raise income both for producers
and parasites, more efficient parasites lower
the income for both. It follows from this that
all incentives for productive entrepreneur-
ship in the end may be eroded if the capacity
of rent extraction gets too high. In that case
the sustainability of a parasitic society is only
possible if the parasites get income from
other sources. In some of the most parasitic
societies this is indeed the case. Important
sources of income are natural resources or the
inflow of aid. Other sources may be from
activities like plundering of unprotected
areas or trafficking in drugs, weapons,
precious stones etc. 
When such sources of income are large,
the parasites have strong incentives to
undermine the institutions that limit their
access to these resources – another form of
destructive creativity. In resource rich
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the profit for parasites strongly exceeds that
of producers. In Mehlum, Moene, and
Torvik (2003 b) we investigate empirically
the interrelationship between resource
availability, institutions and economic
performance. The results show that more
resources on average reduce growth. This
negative effect, however, is only present for
countries where institutions are bad. If
institutions are good, more resources have no
negative effect on growth. 
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